Valid for: 2013/14
Decided by: Education Board B
Date of Decision: 2013-04-10
Elective for: I4, Pi4
Language of instruction: The course will be given in English
The aim of the course is to provide knowledge in the field of game theory.
Knowledge and understanding
For a passing grade the student must
• understand and be able to describe the concepts of static
and dynamic game, perfect, complete and incomplete information,
strategic and extensive form, and strategic substitutes and
complements,
• understand and be able to describe the solution concepts
dominance (strict and weak), iterated strict dominance,
rationalisability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium,
and perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as well as the interrelations
among these concepts,
• be able to formalise competitive situations and other social
and economic interaction problems as games.
• understand and be able to describe the basic concepts of
mechanism design; strategy-proofness; the Groves-Clark mechanism;
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem,
• understand and be able to describe the basic concepts of
social choice theory; Mays Theorem; Arrows Impossiblity
theorem,
• understand and be able to describe the basic concepts of
matching theory; many-to-one matching; two-sided-matching markets;
strategy-proofness; stability; the core.
• get knowledge of how alternative behavioral assumptions can be
incorporated in games and which new predictions this can give.
Competences and skills
For a passing grade the student must
• analyse competitive situations and other social and economic interaction problems as games with appropriate solution concepts.
Judgement and approach
For a passing grade the student must
Students shall be able to describe and discuss their knowledge.
Students shall be able to acquire further knowledge in the area with little guidance or support.
The first part of the course deals with non-cooperative game theory and its economic applications. The main focus is on static and dynamic games with complete information, but also simpler games with incomplete information, in particular signalling games, are considered. The second part of the course deals with mechanism design theory, social choice theory and matching theory. The main focus is on basic concepts but some time will be allocated to dynamic processes/algorithms and computational procedures. The course ends with a small part where games with alternative behavioral assumptions are introduced.
Grading scale: TH
Assessment: Written exams take place at the end of the course. There may be one or more home assignments.
The number of participants is limited to: No
The course might be cancelled: If the number of applicants is less than 8.
The course overlaps following course/s: TEK145
Course coordinator: Professor Hans Carlsson, hans.carlsson@nek.lu.se